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Abstract: Of all the issues in the general theory of language usage, speech act 
theory has probably aroused the widest interest. Psychologists, for example, have suggested 
that the acquisition of the concepts underlying speech acts may be a prerequisite for the 
acquisition of language in general, literary critics have looked to speech act theory for an 
illumination of textual subtleties or for an understanding of the nature of literary genres, 
anthropologists have hoped to find in the theory some account of the nature of magical 
incantations, philosophers have seen potential applications to, amongst other things, the 
status of ethical statements, while linguists have seen the notions of speech act theory as 
variously applicable to problems in syntax, semantics, second language learning, and 
elsewhere. 
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1. Prefatory View 
Of all the issues in the general theory of language usage, speech act theory 
has probably aroused the widest interest. Psychologists, for example, have suggested 
that the acquisition of the concepts underlying speech acts may be a prerequisite for 
the acquisition of language in general, literary critics have looked to speech act 
theory for an illumination of textual subtleties or for an understanding of the nature 
of literary genres, anthropologists have hoped to find in the theory some account of 
the nature of magical incantations, philosophers have seen potential applications to, 
amongst other things, the status of ethical statements, while linguists have seen the 
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notions of speech act theory as variously applicable to problems in syntax, 
semantics, second language learning, and elsewhere. Meanwhile in linguistic 
pragmatics, speech acts remain, along with presupposition 1 and implicature2 in 
particular, one of the central phenomena that any general pragmatic theory must 
account for.  
Given the widespread interest, there is an enormous literature on the subject, 
and this paper is not meant to examine all the work within linguistics, let alone a 
small fraction of the technical literature within language philosophy. 
2. J.L. Austin’s Brand New Ideas – A Huge Step ahead Logical 
Positivism. From Austin to Searle 
To start with the very beginning, one might notice that issues of truth and 
falsity have always been of central interest throughout much of the literature 
focussed on deixis3, presupposition and implicature. Indeed those issues derive 
                                                          
1
 The term points out what a speaker or writer assumes that the receiver of the linguistic message 
already knows. 
For example: 
   speaker A: What about inviting Simon tonight? 
   speaker B: What a good idea; then he can give Monica a lift. 
Here, the presuppositions are, amongst others, that speaker A and B know who Simon and Monica are, 
that Simon has a vehicle, most probably a car, and that Monica has no vehicle at the moment. Children 
often presuppose too much. The may say: 
...and he said “let’s go” and we went there. 
even if the hearers do not know who he is and where there is.  
2
 This linguistic concept is connected to conversational maxims i.e. those unwritten rules about 
conversation which people know and which influence the form of conversational exchanges. For 
example in the following exchange: 
A: Let’s go to the movies. 
B: I have an examination in the morning. 
B’s reply might appear not to be connected to A’s remark. However, since A has made an invitation 
and since a reply to an invitation is usually either an acceptance or a refusal, B’s reply is here 
understood as an excuse for not accepting the invitation (i.e. a refusal). B has used the “maxim” that 
speakers normally gives replies which are relevant to the question that has been asked. The linguist and 
philosopher Grice has suggested that there are four conversational maxims: a). the maxim of quantity: 
give as much information as needed; b). the maxim of quality: speak truthfully; c). the maxim of 
relevance: say things that are relevant; d). the maxim of manner: say things clearly and briefly. The use 
of conversational maxims to imply meaning during conversation is called conversational implicature, 
and the “co – operation” between speakers in using the maxims is sometimes called the co – operative 
principle.  
3
 The concept of deixis points out those words or phrases – called deictic – which directly relate an 
utterance to a time, place or person. 
Examples of deictic words in English are: 
here and there, which refer to a place in relation to the speaker: 
The letter is here. (near the speaker) 




much of their interest from the way in which they remind us of the strict limitations 
to what can be captured in a truth – conditional analysis of sentence meaning. 
Nevertheless in the 1930s there flourished what can now be safely treated as a 
linguistic and philosophical excess, namely the doctrine of logical positivism, a 
central tenet of which was that unless a sentence can, at least in principle, be verified 
(i.e. tested for its truth and falsity), it was strictly speaking meaningless. Of course it 
followed that most ethical, aesthetic and literary discourses, not to mention everyday 
utterances, were simply meaningless. But rather than being seen as a reductio ad 
absurdum, such a conclusion was reviewed by proponents of logical positivism as a 
positively delightful result (see the marvelously prescriptive work by Ayer (1936))1, 
and the doctrine was pervasive in philosophical circles of the time. It was this 
movement (which Wittgenstein had partly stimulated in his Tractus – Logico – 
Philosophicus (1921)) that the later Wittgenstein was actively attacking in 
Philosophical Investigations with the well known slogan “meaning in use”, and the 
insistence that utterances are only explicable in relations to the activities, or 
language – games, in which they play a role.  
It was in the same period, when concern with verifiability and distrust of the 
inaccuracies and vacuities of ordinary language were paramount, that J.L. Austin 
launched his theory of speech acts. There are strong parallels between the latter 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on language usage and language games and Austin’s 
insistence that “the total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual 
phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating.”2 Nevertheless, 
Austin appears to be largely unaware of, and probably quite uninfluenced by, 
Wittgenstein’s later work, and we may treat Austin’s theory as autonomous. 
In the set of lectures that were posthumously published as How to Do Things 
with Words, Austin set about demolishing, in his mild and urbane way, the view of 
language that would place truth conditions as central to language understanding. His 
method was this: 
First, he noted that some ordinary language declarative sentences, contrary 
to logical positivist assumptions, are not apparently used with any intention of 
making true or false statements. These seem to form a special class, and are 
illustrated below: 
                                                          
1
 Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, Victor Gollancz. London, 1936 
2
 Austin, J.L., How to Do Things with Words, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962 
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 (1) I bet you six pence it will rain tomorrow 
I hereby christen this ship the H.M.S. Flounder 
I declare war on Zanzibar  
I apologize 
I dub thee Sir Walter 
I object 
I sentence you to ten years of hard lobour  
I bequeath you my Sansovino 
I give my word 
I warn you that trespassers will be prosecuted 
The peculiar thing about these sentences, according to Austin, is that they 
are not used to say things, i.e. describe states of affairs, but rather actively to do 
things. After you’ve declared war on Zanzibar, or dubbed Sir Walter, or raised an 
objection, the world has changed in substantial ways. Further, you cannot assess 
such utterances are true or false – as illustrated by the bizarre nature of the following 
exchange: 
(2) A: I second the motion. 
B: That’s false.  
(3)A: I dub thee Sir Walter. 
B: Too true. 
Austin termed these peculiar and special sentences performatives, and 
contrasted them to statements, assertions and utterances like them, which he called 
constatatives. 
He then went on to suggest that although, unlike constatatives, 
performatives cannot be true or false (given their special nature, the question of truth 
and falsity simply does not arise), yet they can go wrong. He then set himself the 
task of cataloguing all the ways in which they can go wrong, or be infelicitous as he 
put it. For instance, suppose I say I christened this ship the H.M.S. Flounder, I may 
not succeed in so christening the vessel if, for instance, it is already named 
otherwise, or I am not an appointed namer, or there are no witnesses, slipways, 
bottles of champagne, etc. Successfully naming a ship requires certain institutional 
arrangements, without which the action that the utterance attempts to perform is 
simply null and void. On the basis of such different ways in which a performative 
can fail to come off, Austin produced a typology of conditions which performatives 
must meet if they are to succeed or be felicitous. He called these conditions felicity 




(4) A. (i) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional 
effect; 
(ii) The circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as specified in the 
procedure. 
B. The procedure must be executed (i) correctly and (ii) completely 
C. Often, (i) the persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and 
intentions, as specified in the procedure, and (ii) if consequent conduct 
is specified, then the relevant parties must do so 
As evidence of the existence of such conditions, consider what happens 
when some of them are not fulfilled. For example, suppose, a British citizen says to 
his wife: 
(5) I hereby divorce you 
He will not thereby achieve a divorce, because there simply is no such 
procedure (as in A (i)) whereby merely by uttering (5) divorce can be achieved. In 
contrast in Muslim cultures there is such a procedure, whereby the uttering of a 
sentence with the import of (5) three times consecutively does thereby and ipso facto 
constitute a divorce. As an illustration of a failure of condition A (ii), consider a 
clergymen baptizing the wrong baby, or the right baby with the wrong name, or 
consider the case of one head of state welcoming another, but addressing the 
attendant bodyguard in error. As for condition B, the words must be conventionally 
correct and complete. Finally, the violations of the C conditions are insincerities: to 
advise someone to do something when you really think it would be advantageous for 
you but not for him, or for a juror to find a defendant guilty when he knows him to 
be innocent, would be to violate condition C (i). And to promise to do something 
which one has no intention whatsoever of doing would be a straightforward 
violation of C (ii). 
Austin notes that these violations are not of equal stature. Violations of A 
and B conditions give rise to misfires as he puts it – i.e. the intended actions simply 
fail to come off. Violations of C conditions on the other hand are abuses, not so 
easily detected at the time of the utterance in question, with the consequence that the 
action is performed, but infelicitously or insincerely. 
On the basis of these observations Austin declares that (a) some sentences, 
performatives, are special: uttering them does things, and does not merly say things 
(report states of affairs); and (b) these performative sentences achieve their 
corresponding actions because there are specific conventions linking the words to 
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institutional procedures. Performatives are, if one likes, just rather special sorts of 
ceremony. And unlike constatatives, which are assessed in terms of truth and falsity, 
performatives can only be assessed as felicitous or infelicitous, according to whether 
their felicity conditions are met or not. 
But Austin is playing cunning: given this much, he has his wedge into the 
theory of language and he systematically taps it home. Readers of How to Do Things 
with Words should be warned that there is an internal evolution to the argument, so 
that what is proposed at the beginning is rejected by the end. Indeed what starts off a 
theory about some special and peculiar utterances – performatives – ends up as a 
general theory that pertains to all kinds of utterances. Consequently there are two 
crucial sliding definitions or concepts: firstly, there is a shift from the view that 
performatives are a special class of sentences with peculiar syntactic and pragmatic 
properties, to the view that there is a general class of performative utterances that 
includes both explicit performatives (the old familiar class) and implicit 
performatives, the latter including lots of other kinds of utterances if not all. 
Secondly, there is a shift from the dichotomy performative / constatative to a general 
theory of illocutionary acts of which the various performatives and constatatives 
are just special sub – cases. Let us take these two shifts in order, and review Austin’s 
arguments for the theoretical ‘sea – change’, as he puts it. 
If the dichotomy between performatives and constatatives is to bear the 
important load that Austin indicates, namely the distinction between truth – 
conditionally assessed utterances and those assessed in terms of felicity, than it had 
better be possible to tell the difference – i.e. to characterize performatives in 
independent terms. Austin therefore teases us with an attempt to characterize 
performatives in linguistic terms. He notes that the paradigm cases, as in (1) above, 
seem to have the following properties: they are first person indicative active 
sentences in the simple present tense. This is hardly surprising, since, if in uttering a 
performative the speaker is concurrently performing an action, we should expect just 
those properties. Thus we get the contrast between the following sentences: only the 
first can be uttered performatively. 
(6) a. I bet you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow. 
 b. I am betting you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow. 
 c. I did bet you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow. 
 d. He bets you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow. 
The progressive aspect in (6b) renders that (most probably) a reminder, as 
does the third person in (6d), while the past tense in (6c) indicates a report; none of 





Austin’s work is, however, not easy to summarize as it is rich with 
suggestions that are not followed up, and avoids dogmatic statements of position. Of 
the large amount of philosophical work that it has given rise to, one development in 
particular is worth singling out, i.e. the very influential doctrine of J.R. Searle. 
In general, Searle’s theory of speech acts is just Austin’s systematized, in 
part rigidified, with sallies into the general theory of meaning, and connections to 
other philosophical issues. Austin thought that one could come to an interesting 
classification through taxonomy of performative verbs, but Searle seeks some more 
abstract scheme based on felicity conditions. In fact, he proposes that there are just 
five basic kinds of action that one can perform in speaking, by means of the 
following five types of utterance: 
1. representatives, which commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed 
proposition (paradigm cases: asserting, concluding, etc.) 
 2. directives, which are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do  
something (paradigm cases: requesting, questioning) 
3. commissives, which commit the speaker to some future course of action 
(paradigm cases: promising, threatening, offering) 
4. expressives, which express a psychological state (paradigm cases: 
thanking, apologizing, welcoming, congratulating) 
5. declarations, which effect immediate changes in the institutional state of 
affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extra – linguistic institutions (paradigm 
cases: excommunicating, declaring war, christening, firing from employment) 
To Searle, as with Austin, the illocutionary act is directly achieved by the 
conventional force associated with the issuance of a certain kind of utterance in 
accord with a conventional procedure. In contrast, a perlocutionary act is specific 
to circumstances of issuance, and is therefore not conventionally achieved just by 
uttering that particular utterance, and includes all those effects, intended or 
unintended, often indeterminate, that some particular utterance in some particular 
situation may cause.  
3. A Last Annotation. Instead of Final Judgment  
To squeeze all that goes under the label of speech act theory within the 
confines of a linguistic paper like this one would be not only impossible – as the 
numerous volumes dedicated to this topic could not cover its plenitude of 
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significance – but also undesirable. Consequently, this paper is quite conservative in 
scope and approach, and verges upon only what is of an utmost importance in 
speech act theory. 
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